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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 19-3817
_____________
ORLANDO DEJESUS, Father and next of kin of Blaise DeJesus, deceased;
PAULETTE DEJESUS, Mother and next of kin of Blaise DeJesus, deceased,
Appellants
v.
THE STATE OF DELAWARE, acting through The Delaware Department of
Corrections; LT. TODD DRACE, Individually and in his capacity as a Delaware
Department of Corrections Officer; SGT JOHN KIRLIN, Individually and in his capacity
as a Delaware Department of Corrections Officer; TIFFANI STARKEY, Individually
and in her capacity as a Delaware Department of Corrections Officer;
COMMUNICATIONS COMMUNITY SUPPORT PROGRAMS, INC.
________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. No. 1-15-cv-01065)
District Judge: Hon. Colm Connolly
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 29, 2020
Before: SHWARTZ, PHIPPS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 29, 2020)
______________
OPINION


This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7,
does not constitute binding precedent.

_______________
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.
Orlando and Paulette DeJesus, parents and next of kin of Blaise DeJesus,
(“Plaintiffs”), appeal from the District Court’s order granting summary judgment for
correctional officers Todd Drace, John Kirlin, and Tiffany Starkey (“Defendants”), on
claims arising out of Blaise DeJesus’s suicide while incarcerated at James T. Vaughn
Correctional Center (“Vaughn”). Plaintiffs argue that the Court overlooked their claim
that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to DeJesus’s serious medical need and ruled
instead that Defendants were not deliberately indifferent to his vulnerability to suicide—a
claim they did not pursue. Plaintiffs are correct, so we will remand for the Court to
determine whether Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim that
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to DeJesus’s serious medical need.
I
DeJesus violated his probation and, on August 1, 2014, was sentenced to addiction
rehabilitation. He exhibited signs of withdrawal and was placed in Vaughn’s infirmary,
where he was treated for four days. He was then ordered transferred into Vaughn’s
general inmate housing. After prison officials realized that DeJesus’s brother served as a
prison officer at Vaughn, DeJesus was placed in the Segregated Housing Unit (“SHU”),
at 3:30 p.m. on August 5, 2014. At 9:35 p.m., DeJesus’s body was found hanging, and at
10:05 p.m., he was pronounced dead.

2

Four inmates described what they heard and/or saw from the time DeJesus entered
the SHU until his death.1 According to these inmates, DeJesus told Defendants that: (1)
he did not belong in the SHU; (2) he could not “take being in the [SHU],”JA090; (3) he
needed to speak to someone; (4) he needed to make a phone call; (5) he felt anxious; (6)
he was going through withdrawal; (7) he needed help; and (8) they should call mental
health and ask for medical help on his behalf.
The inmates testified that officers “brush[ed] [] off,” or “blew [] off,” DeJesus’s
repeated complaints and requests. JA085, JA090. This included testimony that DeJesus
cried during a discussion with one officer, who then laughed about it with another officer,
and that DeJesus’s crying and yelling about his needs was “loud” and could be heard by
several inmates in their housing area and, presumably, by the officers. JA079. One
inmate noted that DeJesus was “disheveled,” “wasn’t in his right state of mind,” JA085,
was “not all mentally stable,” JA087, and appeared to be having a panic attack.
Other inmates stated that they tried to get the officers’ attention when DeJesus was
in distress and told the officers they thought DeJesus needed help. More specifically, one
inmate stated that “four or five different inmates said something to the correctional
officers to [] get [DeJesus] help,” and he told one officer himself that DeJesus was “going
through something . . . and that he need[ed] to see somebody.” JA087. Further, the
inmates noted that the officers were not completing rounds and typical checks on the
inmates. Three of the inmates testified that they saw a different inmate banging on the
1

Because we are reviewing a summary judgment ruling, we construe all facts in
the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. Hugh v. Butler Cnty. Fam. YMCA, 418 F.3d 265,
266-67 (3d Cir. 2005).
3

window of the prison officials’ office when he saw that DeJesus had hung himself and
that the officers did not immediately respond. Following DeJesus’s death, several
inmates who interacted with DeJesus, observed him, or thought the officers ignored his
requests for help filed grievances with prison officials.
The prison investigated after DeJesus’s death and discovered that the routine area
and cell checks were not performed for two and a half hours on the night of DeJesus’s
suicide, consistent with the inmates’ testimony. One officer was suspended as a result,
and SHU inmates testified that it was typical for the officers to neglect the required
checks.
II
Plaintiffs filed suit in the District Court, asserting, among other things, that prison
officials failed to provide alternative placement or medical treatment, failed to perform
standard well-being checks, and thus acted with deliberate indifference to DeJesus’s
serious medical need.2 They did not allege that Defendants were deliberately indifferent
to a vulnerability to suicide. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
record showed that DeJesus had no particular vulnerability to suicide. In their responding
brief, Plaintiffs explained that their argument was not specific to vulnerability to suicide
and asserted that they had “established a sufficient record to show [Defendants] were
deliberately indifferent to [DeJesus’s] serious medical condition (aside from suicide[]
itself).” JA033-034 (emphasis omitted).
2

Plaintiffs asserted three causes of action in their complaint but only Count II,
their claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on Defendants violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment is at issue on appeal.
4

The District Court granted Defendants’ motion, analyzing only whether DeJesus
exhibited a particular vulnerability to suicide, and thus, did not examine whether the
record showed Defendants were deliberately indifferent to DeJesus’s serious medical
need. Plaintiffs appeal.
III3
We first examine whether Plaintiffs brought a claim based on deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need, as distinct from a claim that Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to a vulnerability to suicide. See Orie v. Dist. Att’y Allegheny
Cnty., 946 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2019) (noting “[w]e generally do not consider
arguments raised for the first time on appeal” (quoting Gardner v. Grandolsky, 585 F.3d
786, 793 (3d Cir. 2009))). Plaintiffs did.
First, the Complaint alleged deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, and
not deliberate indifference to vulnerability to suicide. Second, in response to Defendants’
argument at summary judgment that DeJesus had not exhibited vulnerability to suicide,
Plaintiffs stated that they were pursuing a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need. Thus, Plaintiffs sought relief based on deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need. The District Court nevertheless ruled on whether the record supported a
3

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
1343(a)(3). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of a district
court’s order granting summary judgment is plenary. Mylan Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., 723 F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law when the non-moving party fails to make “a sufficient showing on an
essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
5

claim for deliberate indifference to vulnerability to suicide, which Plaintiffs did not
allege.
Plaintiffs do not dispute the District Court’s ruling with respect to vulnerability to
suicide. Instead, they argue that they sought relief based on Defendants’ deliberate
indifference to DeJesus’s serious medical need, and the Court erred because it did not
evaluate that claim. We agree. This oversight is not harmless because the two bases for
liability have separate elements.
To hold prison officials liable for failure to prevent a suicide, a plaintiff must
establish that: (1) the inmate had a “particular vulnerability to suicide, meaning that there
was a strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility, that a suicide would be
attempted;” (2) the prison officials “knew or should have known” of that vulnerability;
and (3) those officers “acted with reckless or deliberate indifference” to the inmate’s
particular vulnerability. Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2017)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This test evolved out of our evaluation
of deliberate indifference to serious medical need claims, but it governs cases where
plaintiffs allege prison officials are liable for an inmate’s suicide. See Woloszyn v. Cnty.
of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2005) (“A particular vulnerability to suicide
represents a serious medical need”); see also Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d
1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991) (explaining that the definition of deliberate indifference to
serious medical need, from Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), “provided the
theoretical underpinnings” for recognizing that particular vulnerability to suicide is a type
of serious medical need). “While we have recognized that a particular vulnerability to
6

suicide qualifies as a serious medical need, . . . a vulnerability to suicide is not the
sole need on which [a] claim [can be] focused.” Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 227 (citation
omitted).
A plaintiff who alleges defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical need must show that (1) he had a serious medical need,4 (2) defendants were
deliberately indifferent to that need,5 and (3) the deliberate indifference caused harm or
physical injury to the plaintiff.6 See, e.g., Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 266 (3d Cir.
2003); Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346-47 (3d Cir.
1987). A deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim can apply in various
inmate medical situations, including failing to provide adequate mental health services.

4

A medical need is serious if (1) it “has been diagnosed by a physician as
requiring treatment,” Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347
(3d Cir. 1987) (citation omitted), (2) it “is so obvious that a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention,” id. ; or (3) where the denial of treatment
would result in the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted), or a life-long handicap or permanent loss,
Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 347.
5
Deliberate indifference can be shown where a defendant knew the plaintiff had a
need for medical care but refused to provide that care, Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 228
(citation omitted), denies “reasonable requests for medical treatment . . . [when] such
denial exposes the inmate ‘to undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury,’”
id. at 228 (alterations in original) (quoting Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346), delays necessary
medical treatment for non-medical reasons, chooses “an easier and less efficacious
treatment of the inmate’s condition,” or “prevent[s] an inmate from receiving
recommended treatment for serious medical needs,” Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346-47
(internal quotations omitted).
6
A plaintiff must show that prison officials were aware of and “recklessly
disregard[ed] a substantial risk of serious harm.” Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 227 (quoting
Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir. 2009)); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (explaining that a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if
he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety”).
7

Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 227-29, 231-32. An analysis of a vulnerability to suicide claim
focuses more narrowly on evidence showing a strong likelihood of suicide. Id. at 223-24.
Here, Plaintiffs “sought to hold prison officials . . . accountable for failing to meet
[DeJesus’s] serious need for [medical care],” and did not seek relief based on
vulnerability to suicide. Id. at 227. Because these are two different claims, and the
District Court did not examine one of them, namely Plaintiffs’ claim of deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need, we will remand.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we will remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.7
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Judge Phipps agrees that in granting summary judgment for the prison guards,
the District Court did not address the question of whether they acted with deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need, but due to the fully developed summary judgment
record and briefing, he would, on de novo review, resolve that issue through affirmance
of the District Court’s judgment, and on that basis, he respectfully dissents. See Laurel
Gardens, LLC v. McKenna, 948 F.3d 105, 116 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Generally, we may
affirm on any ground supported by the record, and an appellee may urge affirmance on
such a ground even if the district court overlooked it or it involves an attack on the
district court’s reasoning.” (emphasis added)).
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